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Abstract: In 1906, a German physician, Dr. Alois Alzheimer, specifically identified a
collection of brain cell abnormalities (and the formation of plaque in the brain) as a
disease, which forever changed the way scientists view degenerative cognitive disorders.
Today, this brain disease bears his name, and is one of the most common diseases among
the aging population. The discovery of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) can be seen as a
revolutionary, paradigmatic shift in regards to scientific discovery from a Kuhnian
perspective. In that vein, the discovery presents philosophical implications for the notion
of personhood and how those suffering from AD are treated in society.
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I. Introduction of the Topic
When considering the history of scientific development, one often thinks of
groundbreaking discoveries such as the polio vaccination, the double-helix structure of
DNA, and the Human Genome Project. To that effect, we often overlook the
revolutionary discovery of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), perhaps taking for granted the
prominence of mental illness in society and the aging population. Progressive mental
deterioration in old age has been documented throughout history. However, it was not
until 1906 that a German physician, Dr. Alois Alzheimer, specifically identified a
collection of brain cell abnormalities (and the formation of plaque in the brain) as a
disease. Today, this degenerative brain disorder bears his name, and is one of the most
common diseases among the aging population. Since its discovery 107 years ago, there
have been various scientific breakthroughs in AD research, pushing the boundaries of the
AD paradigm.
Dementia, the medical condition that often progresses to AD, was addressed in
the 18th and 19th centuries; however, it was often associated with “general paralysis,”
“madness” and “hysteria” (Berrios 1) – general terms used to define a broad array of
mental illness symptoms. It was solely because of Dr. Alzheimer, and his discovery of
this particular advanced-stage mental deterioration, that led to its differentiation from
other types of mental illness. More importantly, individuals must ask themselves about
the impact scientific development has on their conceptions of reality – and in this case –
the philosophical impact of the discovery of AD.
To support the philosophical significance of scientific paradigm shifts and
personhood, I will use Thomas Kuhn’s methodology of philosophical analysis. A
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paradigm shift (or revolutionary science) is, according to Kuhn in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, a change in the basic assumptions, or paradigms, within the ruling
theory of science, which is in contrast to his notion of normal science where scientists
problem-solve within a paradigm. The periodic change in science causes individuals to
rethink personhood – that is, the status of being a person in a given environment. For
example, Kuhn in The Copernican Revolution writes about how the changing
understanding of the sun-centered universe from medieval to modern Western society
seemed to affect man’s relation to the universe and to God… it was “therefore also a part
of the transition in Western man’s sense of values” (2). The same is true for those in the
early 20th century who were living during the discovery of AD.
Without an examination of scientific paradigm shifts, it is difficult to comprehend
the impact of science on the external world. Without such shifts, scientific advancement
does not occur. However, it is because of them that acceptable and valid science is
questioned within the professional community. As science keeps evolving, it is difficult
for individuals to pinpoint an explanation for how the world works and how they can
define themselves within it. For those who are not cognitively impaired, defining their
sense of reality within the realm of altering science is difficult. For those who are
experiencing mental deterioration, their ability to perceive the world is biologically
altered and nearly impossible. Concurrently, the scientific understanding of the world
around them continues to evolve. For these individuals, the notion of personhood is an
abstract idea because it can never be fully explored in a world of paradigm shifts and
mental deterioration. Therefore, Dr. Alzheimer’s discovery of AD served as a paradigm
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for other diseases, while simultaneously raising philosophical questions concerning the
definition of personhood.
II. History of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)
Dr. Alois Alzheimer was born on June 14, 1864 in Markbreit, Germany, and
studied medicine at the top universities in Germany. By 1888, he was promoted to senior
physician (Maurer 1546). Since its discovery 107 years ago, dementia of the Alzheimer’s
type (as it is formerly known) is considered to be one of the most devastating diseases of
old age. Despite intensive research about the illness, the disease still remains elusive
(Zilka 343). However, the advances of Alois Alzheimer are revolutionary because the
concept of psychosis “dates only from the late 19th century. It was formed out of the
remnants of three ancient categories: insanity, alienation, and dementia” (Berrios 1).
During the first half of the 19th century, epilepsy and other insanities were considered
neurotic disorders. “Under the influence of factors such as the decline of the 18th century
Cullean concept of neurosis, the development of the new descriptive psychopathology,
the introduction of statistics, and the availability of longitudinal observations of
hospitalized cohorts,” mental illness was redefined (Berrios 1). Before the discovery of
AD, general paralysis was the most common diagnosis of patients with depression who
went on to develop dementia, and by 1883, there was awareness that this severe affective
disorder created cognitive impairment (Berrios 393).
“Alzheimer made fundamental contributions to understanding other diseases such
as vascular dementia, Huntington’s chorea, syphilis, brain tumors, and epilepsy,” (Zilka
345). His many years of research “serve as the foundation for today’s extensive search
for a cure of the disease that bears his name” (Zilka 345). The markings of his
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revolutionary research began in 1906, at the 37th meeting of Southwest German
Psychiatrists in Tübingen. Alzheimer presented his clinical and neuropathological
findings on Augusta D, a 51-year-old woman, who suffered from an unusual disease of
the cerebral cortex, which caused memory loss and disorientation, followed by
depressions and hallucinations (Zilka 344). He recorded his findings in a short abstract
and presented it at the 37th meeting. He reported at the conference, “the pathological
examination revealed atrophy and specific lesions, which he described as a ‘paucity of
cells in the cerebral cortex and clumps of filaments between nerve cells’ (eine eigenartige
Erkrankung der Hirnrinde, as it is known in German),” (Zilka 344). These results were
declared, after further research, to be the “first images of plaque and neurofibrillary
tangles” in Augusta D.’s brain (Karolinksa Institutet 1).
On November 25th, 1901, a 51-year-old woman named Augusta (sometimes
spelled as Auguste) Deter was sent to the Frankfurt Hospital, where Alzheimer worked.
She had the symptoms of the legal definition of dementia, which included impaired
memory, aphasia, disorientation, and psychosocial incompetence. Her condition became
more severe, and she began to lose her cognitive functions and to experience
hallucinations (Maurer 1546). “Because of her age, Deter was diagnosed with presenile
dementia; today, the diagnosis would be early-onset AD, which is defined as
development of the condition before the age of 65” (Maurer 1547). At age 55, Deter
died, and by this time, Alzheimer had left Frankfurt and was working under Emil
Kraepelin at the Royal Psychiatric Clinic in Munich. Upon her death, Alzheimer
requested that her medical records be sent to him (Maurer 1548). In 1995, Dr. Maurer and
his colleagues rediscovered the file (Maurer 1548).
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Alzheimer, in those files, concluded that Deter “had no sense of time or place.
She could barely remember details of her life and frequently gave answers that had
nothing to do with the questions and were incoherent. Her moods changed rapidly”
(Maurer 1547). She seemed to be consciously aware of her helplessness. Alzheimer
called it the “Disease of Forgetfulness” (Maurer 1548). For example, around midday
during one afternoon of evaluation, Deter ate pork and cauliflower. Alzheimer
interviewed her as she ate; Deter’s responses are in italics in this excerpt from the
medical file dated November 26, 1901:
“What are you eating? Spinach (she was chewing meat). What are you
eating now? “First, I eat potatoes and then horseradish. Write a 5. She
writes, ‘A woman.’ Write an 8. She writes, Augusta (while she is writing
she again says, It’s like I have lost myself) (Maurer 1548).
On November 29, 1901, on the same page, Maurer reprints this excerpt of Alzheimer’s
file:
If you buy six eggs, at 7 dimes each, how much is it? Differently. On what
street do you live? I can tell you. I must wait a bit. What did I ask you?
Well, this is Frankfurt or Main. One what street do you live?
Waldmarstreet, not, no…When did you marry? I don’t know at present.
The woman lives on the same floor. Which woman? The woman where we
are living…I show her a key, a pencil, and a book, and she names them
correctly. What did I show you? I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s difficult,
isn’t it? So anxious, so anxious. I show her three fingers; how many
fingers? Three. Are you still anxious. Yes. How many fingers did I show
you? Frankfurt or Main.
Five years after her evaluation, she died. Alzheimer requested that her medical files be
sent to him for further evaluation.
When Alzheimer examined the reports of her brain and the autopsy, he found that
in the later years of her illness, her condition had deteriorated considerably. He noted
previously that he had seen this type of degenerative condition in other patients, but this
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was the first one who had experienced these symptoms at such a young age. Her death
was the result of sepsis caused by an infected bedsore. On examining her brain, he found
senile plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Maurer 1548). Alzheimer anticipated the
debate about which type of dementia Deter may have had by his remark in the 1907, “a
histopathological analysis of a later point will show the peculiarity of this case” (Maurer
1549). In 1910, the disease was named after Alzheimer when his superior Emil Kraepelin
found the description of this disease in a textbook (Karolinksa Institutet 1). More than a
century later, her case was re-examined with modern medical technology, where
scientists found a genetic cause for her disease. Maurer published the results, and
according to it, “a mutation in the PSEN1 gene was found, which alters the function of
gamma secretase, and is a known cause of young onset AD” (Maurer 1549).
Since then, there have been several breakthroughs in science regarding the
particulars of AD. The Karolinksa Institutet annotated the following timeline. In 1976,
the deficiency of the acetylcholine (ACH) neurotransmitter was linked to AD, paving the
way for the drugs in use today to slow of the progression of the disease. In 1984, Glenner
and Wong identified the presence of the beta-amyloid protein in the plaque developed in
the brain. In 1986, the tau protein was discovered in the development of the
neurofibrillary tangles. In 1992, mutations of the gene that codes for the protein deposited
in the plaque were identified. In 1993, a mutation in the apoplipoprotein E gene was
linked to AD, while the first AD drug to inhibit the production of ACH was registered in
the United States. In 2002, the new form of the NMDA receptor blocker was registered
(1).

Most recently, in 2012, researchers discovered the gene TREM2’s potential

metabolic pathway in the production of toxic shards of a protein that accumulates in
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plaques on the brain. TREM2 is only the second gene discovered to increase the risk of
AD substantially in older persons (Guerriero 1). These developments are single-handedly
associated with Alzheimer’s discovery, because his revolutionary research was the
cornerstone for all of the following scientific investigations.
III. A Kuhnian Analysis: The Significance of Paradigm Shifts
A mature science, according to Kuhn, experiences alternating phases of normal
science and revolutions. In normal science, the key theories, instruments, values, and
metaphysical assumptions that comprise the disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, allowing
for the generation of solutions, whereas in a scientific revolution the disciplinary matrix
undergoes revision, in order to permit the solution of the anomalous puzzles that
disturbed the preceding period of normal science. Kuhn sees multiple revolutions in the
history of science; that is, multiple cases of the overthrow of one scientific paradigm by
another. The discovery of AD is a clear example of this, both historically and
philosophically. As evident above, the discovery of AD is distinctly paradigmatic, and
Kuhn would agree.
In order to apply a Kuhnian analysis to this scientifically historical event, one has
to accept his assumptions (one’s elaborated on through out The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions): that scientific fields undergo periodic paradigm shifts rather than solely
progressing in a linear and continuous way; that these paradigm shifts open up new
approaches to understanding what scientists would never have considered valid before;
and that the notion of scientific truth, at any given moment, cannot be established solely
by objective criteria but is defined by a consensus of a scientific community. Competing
paradigms are frequently incommensurable, that is, they are competing accounts of
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reality, which cannot be coherently reconciled. Thus, one’s comprehension of science can
never attain full objectivity.
A particularly important part of Kuhn’s thesis in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions focuses upon one specific component of the disciplinary matrix. This is the
consensus on exemplary instances of scientific research. The central idea of this book is
that the development of science is driven, in normal periods of science, by adherence to
what Kuhn calls a “paradigm.”

He cites Aristotle’s analysis of motion, Ptolemy’s

computations of planetary positions, Lavoisier’s application of the balance, and
Maxwell’s mathematization of the electromagnetic field as paradigms (Kuhn 23). The
functions of a paradigm are to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and to provide the
tools for their solution (Kuhn 35). A crisis in science arises when confidence is lost in the
ability of the paradigm to solve particularly worrying puzzles called “anomalies” (Kuhn
52). Crisis is followed by a scientific revolution if a rival supersedes the existing
paradigm. Kuhn claimed that science guided by one paradigm would be
“incommensurable” with science developed under a different paradigm, by which he
meant that there is no common measure for assessing the different scientific theories
(Kuhn 145-148). This thesis of incommensurability does not allow for a theory of normal
science, consequently rejecting some traditional views of scientific development, such as
the view that later science builds on the knowledge contained within earlier theories, or
the view that later theories are closer approximations to the truth than earlier theories.
He adds that “normal science is cumulative and it owes its success to the ability of
scientists regularly to select problems that can be solved with conceptual and
instrumental techniques close to those already in existence” (Kuhn 96). Although it is
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intuitive to say that science contains some level of accumulation, Kuhn holds that such is
incommensurable throughout his writings, and then, later revises his thesis to allow for a
cumulative process. Although many would view this theory as inconsistent, in the case of
AD, the problem of accumulation is irrelevant because the discovery of AD was the first
of its kind. The subsequent developments following the initial discovery could be more
thoroughly analyzed in regards to incommensurability. Dr. Alzhiemer’s work, however,
was not only revolutionary then, but also original.
For example, Aristotelians said that a stone fell because its “nature” drove it
toward the center of the universe (Kuhn 104). Kuhn devoted The Copernican Revolution
to exploring the history of scientific development to further support his philosophy of
paradigmatic shifts. Kuhn’s analysis of the Copernican paradigm shift emphasized that,
in its beginning, it did not offer more accurate predictions of celestial events, such as
planetary positions, than the Ptolemaic system, but instead appealed to some practitioners
based on a promise of better, simpler, solutions that might be developed at some point in
the future. Kuhn called the core concepts of an ascendant revolution its paradigms. Kuhn
writes, “Copernicus’ innovation first destroyed that traditional explanation of planetary
motion and then, as modified by Kepler, suggested a radically new approach to celestial
physics,” (Kuhn 245). Dr. Alzheimer’s discoveries overturned previously accepted views
of degenerative cognitive disorders, which were clumped together as neurotic disorders,
such as epilepsy and insanity (Berrios 1). By extension, Dr. Alzheimer’s work can be
viewed as paradigmatic.
He writes, “The new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation,
emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply

	
  

Ilg 11

immersed in crisis” (Kuhn 89). In this sense, paradigm shifts are almost spontaneous and
not directly affiliated with normal science. Scientific revolutions are then “noncumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in
part by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn 92). Moreover, Kuhn claims that paradigm
shifts in science are equivalent to the transition of politics within a community. “As in
political revolutions, so in paradigm choice there is no standard higher than the assent of
the relevant community” (Kuhn 93). Kuhn’s hunch is that scientific change brings about
a change in the entities that are taken to be primitive and unexplained. These concepts
hold when applied to AD.
In 1910, Emil Kraepelin in his influential, Psychiatrae: Ein Lehrbuch für
Studierende and Aerzte, stated, “The clinical interpretation of this AD is still unclear.
Although the anatomical findings suggest that we are dealing with a particularly serious
form of senile dementia. However, the fact is that this disease sometimes starts as early as
in the late forties” (Zilka 344). It is because of the age of onset that researchers
determined that this disease was something newly discovered, and it became a significant
in the development of this new brain disease. “Relatively rare AD was separated from
senile dementia and accepted as a diagnostic category. This classification remained intact
until the last third of the 20th century” (Zilka 345). It is evident, then, that AD created a
new paradigm in regards to psychiatry and degenerative cognitive disorders. However, as
Kuhn also argues in his writings, scientific progress is not purely objective. “Some
authors claim that Kraepelin’s decision to separate a pre-senile form of dementia from
senile dementia and to put the name of AD for the former one was most probably inspired
by political reasons rather than by exact scientific data” (Zilka 345). Here, the problem of
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trying to balance subjective goals with scientific fact is a realistic struggle.
As far as the main conclusion of Kuhn’s theory is concerned, Kuhn’s argument is
convincing. There is no doubt that the worldview that emerges from a scientific
revolution may be incommensurable, but it is so in a weak sense. That is, new terms
describing the new revolution may not be straightforwardly comparable to the “old
science,” and the new paradigm leads to at least some incompatible predictions when
compared to the scientific theory it replaced. The same holds true for AD – the minute
details separating pre-senile and senile dementia are still relatively unclear today, 107
years after the discovery of AD. After reading The Copernican Revolution, it is clear that
most paradigmatic shifts are the results of centuries of scientific research. The history of
scientific development is a long one. The major incongruity within Kuhn’s theory raises
the question: If many paradigms do not change in a sudden way, how are they not built
on prior knowledge? There is often a foundation supporting paradigm shifts in order to
allow it to occur. For example, the paradigm shifts concerning planetary motion came out
of centuries of scientific research. After reflecting on the prompt, it is clear that Kuhn
comes from two different vantage points.
At one point, Kuhn claims, at least, that scientific advancement is historically
aggregated. In some cases this theory is true, but it does not completely explain the
“eureka” moments of scientific discovery or the scientific discoveries that happen
accidentally or spontaneously. The field of psychiatry is aggregated, but the discovery of
AD is an equivalent to these eureka moments of scientific discovery. In order to revise
this, Kuhn contradicts himself by first claiming that science usually “does not aim at
novelties of fact or theory,” but then goes on to say that “history even suggests that the
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powerful scientific enterprise has developed a uniquely powerful technique for producing
surprises” (52). Kuhn does not elaborate on this method for producing “surprises;” he
asserts that it exists to account for the fact that his philosophy demands that the usual
course of science produces both slow progress and rapid change.
When Kuhn later writes that science is not cumulative, he means that the
scientific revolution replacing “normal science” is one separate and distinct from, in a
strict sense, the outdated science. However, with this logic, he neglects that many
scientific revolutions come out of an older paradigm wherein the scientific revolution
often begins as a revision to old scientific standards. Ultimately, the lesson that one could
draw from this analysis is that paradigmatic shifts are necessary in order for science to
progress, but these changes cannot happen in isolation; paradigm shifts must occur (to
some extent) within the historical contexts of normal science – the science that
chronologically preceded it. In the case of AD, it was discovered within the context of
degenerative cognitive disorders, but it was a significantly new discovery. Without
acknowledging science’s chronological development, the history of scientific
advancement is lost. Historically, not only did the discovery of AD further advance the
science of psychiatry, but it altered the scientific imagination in that it transformed the
world of philosophy.
IV. A Philosophical Connection Between AD and Personhood
In order to learn more about ourselves in relation to reality and the world within
it, we often try to answer scientific questions. If we accept that philosophy and science
exist together, and that they are not incongruous disciplines, then we can further analyze
the philosophical implications of scientific discovery. From a philosophical perspective,
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personhood can be broadly viewed, but for the purposes of this paper, I will only examine
a post-modernist view, since Kuhn is a post-modernist philosopher. “Any attempt to
define the meaning of the notion of the person opens a window to a vast horizon of
inquiry that raises many additional questions on a variety levels” (Torchia xi). In relation
to AD, the notion of personhood is inextricably linked. How could a person with AD
understand the world around them if what he/she knew at one point is no longer relevant
to their current experience? Does the fact that these people go through their own
paradigmatic shifts and their “demented” perception in fact their new, and only valid,
truth? Or is it that the disease simply taints their understanding of reality, and their
perceptions of reality are wrong? Perhaps these questions cannot be answered, but by
using the notion of paradigm shifts as a way to explain the shift in our understanding of
science and the world around us, it is fair to say that both the scientific and philosophical
impacts of paradigm shifts are necessary for the growth of human understanding,
potential, and personhood.
There are different points along the continuum of embryological development at
which different writers claim the definition of “personhood” (Irving 1). Before that
biological point, the human embryo or human fetus is considered only an “object,” a
“thing” which may be used or dealt with according to the personal desires of a human
person. After that particular biological marker event (conception, fertilization, birth,
puberty, etc.) we suddenly have a human person, who is now considered a “subject” or an
entity deserving protection against the interests, objectives, or desires of another human
person (Irving 2). Therefore, the fundamental question underlying the notion of AD is
when do these entities become undeserving of such protections, if at all? Does a person
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lose their personhood if their cognition (another biological marker) begins to deteriorate
or fail? In order to better analyze these questions, one should turn to an analysis of
consciousness because it distinguishes humans from other non-human animals.
Although it is ambiguous as to what clearly constitutes a conscious experience,
the underlying assumption among post-modernists, like Charles Taylor, is that “in the
absence of self-consciousness (and, by extension, consciousness of others) one does not
qualify as a member of the moral community” (Torchia 221). In this regard, “moral
standing presupposes the social interaction of beings who enjoy rich inner life that allows
them to enter a web of relationships carrying personal rights and generating
corresponding duties to others” (Torchia 221). If this holds, then this is devastating to
those with AD who cannot participate in social interactions or who cannot maintain
responsibilities necessary to carry out personal duties. Postmodernist philosophers
heavily emphasize overt characteristics as criteria of personhood (Torchia 223).
“Postmodern assessments of personhood are ultimately based on how one is perceived by
others in public forum, rather than on what one is by virtue of a nature, essence, or
substantial form” (Torchia 223). Therefore, how individuals, and by extension,
individuals with AD are perceived is the primary factor in determining their personhood.
The postmodern distinction between humanity and personhood plays a role in
many contemporary bioethical debates regarding end-of-life decisions and the right to life
to those deprived of higher consciousness (Torchia 223), such as individuals with AD.
“The loss of rational capacity, autonomy, and conscious experience presupposes a
corresponding loss of moral agency and the personhood on which moral agency depends”
(Torchia 223). However, there is a difference, I hold, between the human personal life
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and the human biological life. In other words, because a person loses his or her mental
faculties does not mean that he or she is less of a person, and yet, politically and socially
there are many instances where those with AD are maltreated, discriminated against, and
underrepresented. This reinforces the notion that those with degenerative cognitive
disorders comes a loss of moral agency and positive regard by others.
Therefore, the only solution is to promote scientific advancement and progress in
order to enable those with AD to slow the rate of progression and continue to live
competent lives. Here, a Kuhnian analysis would be essential. Once these discoveries are
made (the current research being done as described in part II), then the paradigm could be
reevaluated and tested. At this point, AD is in a state of normal science, after serving as a
revolutionary shift within the field of psychiatry. If and when these discoveries are made,
the paradigm may shift again. At this point, there is enough political inertia (eg. the
“Walk to End Alzheimer’s” campaign) to encourage fundraising for such research. If we
are to be a forward-thinking country in regards to scientific research, then the tension
between science and philosophy (or more specifically, biomedical ethics) will continue to
grow.
V. Conclusion
Given the scientific and philosophical problems inherent in the positions which
argue for the various biological marker events of “personhood,” can we accept either the
science that is used or the rationalistic or empiricist philosophical definitions of human
beings versus human persons, which are incorporated into those arguments? Or is it even
possible to reconcile the correct biological facts with a philosophical definition of a
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human being or a human person? Assessing the discovery of AD from both philosophical
and scientific frameworks raises the question, can philosophy and science truly coexist?
Accepting the truism that progress occurs when one replaces a theory that solves
more problems, Laudan (one of Kuhn’s biggest critics), in Progress and Its Problems,
insists this truism is historically accurate only if the concept of “problem” is broadened
beyond the empirical problem issues of traditional philosophers of science (70-90). If
philosophical accounts of scientific progress are based solely on solved empirical
problems, while anomalies and conceptual problems are not factored in, the picture of
science that emerges fails to reflect the judgments of scientists about progress of their
own disciplines. Despite weaknesses in Kuhn’s argumentation, applying a Kuhnian
analysis to the history of AD is appropriate because he argued for an episodic model in
which periods of conceptual continuity in normal science were interrupted by periods of
revolutionary science, which includes the formal discovery of AD.
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